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In the Analects, discussions of how someone should act or had acted
are accompanied by some assessment of that person’s character, some
conclusion as to his having or lacking what are traditionally understood
as Confucian virtues—ren (benevolence or humanity), yi (appropri-
ateness or rightness, or even righteousness), li (rites, rituals, or ritual
propriety), zhi (wisdom), xin (trustworthiness), and yong (courage).1
Scholars have different views as to how and to what extent Confucian
virtues are comparable with virtues in Western ethics like Aristotle’s.2
The Analects is as preoccupied with the exemplary person (junzi) and
his virtues as the Nicomachean Ethics is concerned with elucidating the
virtues via portraits of the virtuous man. Alasdair MacIntyre considers
the concept of virtue secondary to that of a role-figure or paradigmatic
individual in virtue ethics.3 In Confucianism, virtues are tied together
in the ideals of the sage (shengren) and the exemplary person ( junzi).
While there are no doubt significant differences between Confucian
ethics and various Western virtue ethics, there is a prima facie
resemblance among them in their concern with character and the 
question,“What kind of person should one become?”
A wide variety of moral theories, including Kantian and utilitarian
ones, could give a subordinate place to virtues understood as the
enduring and effective dispositions to act morally. While acknowl-
edging its internal diversity, virtue ethics has been distinguished from
deontological and consequentialist moral theories by the priority it
gives to the agent’s character, in contrast to principles and conse-
quences of actions. As a recent collection of works on virtue ethics
puts it, “the basic judgments in ethics are judgments about charac-
ter.”4 The central ideals of the sage and the exemplary person demon-
strate this primacy of character in Confucian ethics.
In virtue ethics, the ethical thing to do in any situation is what a
virtuous person, the sage, or at least the exemplary person in the case
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of Confucianism, would do. While this may still involve application of
“virtue rules,” going beyond the confines of rule-governed behavior
is considered a strength of virtue ethics for many who are critical of
conceptions of morality as systems of rules. Rule-governed concep-
tions are at best incomplete since application of rules must at some
stage involve non rule-governed judgment if we are to avoid the
problem of infinite regress. They appear ungrounded and unconvinc-
ing in an age of skepticism about divine lawgivers and universal
natural laws for humans qua moral agents. They are more often than
not too abstract and rigid to guide action. They tend to be overly
impersonal and neglect the problem of motivation. They override the
integrity of moral agents and provide too narrow a view of what is
important in human experience. To many, the revival of virtue ethics
is a response to the failure of rule-governed approaches to morality.5
As a better alternative to rule-governed morality, virtue ethics must
provide, among other things, an account of how one comes to act 
ethically in the absence of rules. Without completely rejecting rule-
governed morality, Antonio Cua’s exploration of the possibility of
creative moral agency within moral practices gives us some idea of
how our understanding of moral agency could go beyond rule-
governed behavior. He demonstrates effectively how paradigmatic
individuals achieve moral creativity within a moral practice struc-
tured by rules, combining respect for moral practice (including moral
principles and rules) with adaptability in the face of changing 
circumstances.6
This article examines what is involved when a non-paradigmatic
agent emulates paradigmatic characters. The common practice of
adapting the thinking in early Confucian texts to fit some Western
model of moral reason is problematic. Without totally denying the 
relevance of reason—at least some modified conception adapted to
Chinese thinking—to Confucianism, I shall show that we can better
understand the role of emulating paradigmatic characters in Confu-
cian ethics by a closer examination of the imagination and emotion,
which have been relatively neglected in favor of reason in Western
philosophy. In understanding the imaginative and emotional aspects
of emulating paradigmatic characters, we shall hopefully gain some
insights into how virtue ethics might avoid some of the pitfalls of
overly rule-governed, reason-centered approaches to morality.
The Paradigmatic Character of Confucius
Confucius is the most important paradigmatic character in the Con-
fucian tradition. Though too modest to lay claim to sagehood himself,
he was elevated to that exalted status by Mencius.7 Mention of the
410 sor-hoon tan
“the Sage” in later literature usually refers to Confucius, who was per-
ceived as personifying the ultimate in sagehood, one whom all who
aspire to the Confucian way should emulate. Such emulation began
with Confucius’ own students who contributed to the Analects, which
gives us glimpses of Confucius at home and abroad; Confucius wel-
coming friends, greeting official guests, associating with students,
drinking at communal feasts; Confucius participating in sacrificial and
court rituals; Confucius in his encounters with enemies, with dubious
characters; Confucius dealing with people from all walks of life, duke
or peasant, madman or musician; Confucius playing the zither alone,
singing along with others, accepting or rejecting gifts, eating, and
sleeping. One surmises that his students recorded these vignettes
because they found something to emulate in what they observed and
considered worthy of passing down to future generations.
Many readers have been amused, intrigued, or baffled by Book 10
of the Analects, with its descriptions of Confucius’ apparel—the exact
kinds of materials used, the precise manner of wearing them—and his
behavior—standing and bowing just so, walking with this or that gait
or pace, gesturing just so, the detailed nuances of his expressions. We
are told that Confucius “did not eat his fill of polished rice, nor did
he eat his fill of finely minced meat.”
He did not eat rice that had gone sour or fish and meat that had
spoiled. He did not eat food that was not properly prepared nor did
he eat except at proper times. He did not eat food that had not been
properly cut up, nor did he eat unless the proper sauce was available
(Analects 10.8).
What are we to make of such passages, including one informing us
that, “When in bed, he did not lie like a corpse (Analects 10.24)”?
Confucius’ students would have available to them the context in
which these behaviors were observed. Without that context, inter-
pretations could only be tentative, but they need not be less thought-
provoking and inspiring. In general, Book 10 is usually read as a
record of ritual norms followed by Confucius. Certain behaviors
should be avoided because they embody attitudes incompatible with
a good character. Not eating his fill of delicacies such as “polished 
rice and finely minced meat” was probably a ritual norm that shows
consideration for others sharing the meal. Indiscriminate eating man-
ifests greed or morally irresponsible treatment of one’s own body.
Perhaps the lack of proper preparation and sauces shows a careless-
ness and lack of respect on the part of those preparing or providing
the food that should not condoned.
Perhaps Confucius considered lying like a corpse an indication of
slothfulness or a total physical abandonment that would be against a
junzi’s moral character. Confucius’ attention to demeanor in bed is
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also evident in Analects 10.10, “he did not converse at meals; nor did
he talk in bed.” Virtue ethics requires a self-transformation so pro-
found that it affects one’s behavior even in the most private
moments.8 One’s virtue may even govern one’s dreams, as in Analects
7.5, Confucius remarks, “How I have gone downhill! It has been such
a long time since I dreamt of the Duke of Zhou.” We may think him
too exacting in requiring people to be virtuous even in sleep, and
prefer to read him as speaking hyperbolically to make a point: If our
behavior during sleep could by some feat of imagination matter eth-
ically, how much more important it is to behave in accordance with
the rites and other Confucian virtues in our waking moments.
For such minutiae of Confucius’ daily life to acquire philosophical
meaning, or constitute ethical lessons, one needs to imagine those
behaviors, to aesthetically appreciate what is so wrong about those
behaviors that Confucius assiduously avoided them, as well as to dis-
cover the reasons that justify Confucius’ behavior. Our difficulties in
understanding these passages stem first from a failure of imagination.
These descriptions may appear bizarre and ridiculous. On the surface,
they seem at best archaic curiosities with little relevance to contem-
porary life, even if they are recognized as describing historically spe-
cific ritual behavior. They take on ethical significance only if we probe
deeper the meaning and function of ritual action in the Confucian
world, and explore the continued relevance of ritual even in the
twenty-first century.9 For our present purpose, we are more interested
in what Confucius’ students were emulating on these occasions.
Learning and Thinking
The Master said, “Surely when one says ‘The rites, the rites,’ it not
enough merely to mean presents of jade and silk? Surely when one
says ‘Music, music,’ it is not enough merely to mean bells and
drums?” (Analects 17.11)
Emulating paradigmatic characters is not merely imitating exter-
nal forms of behavior. Observing and noting those forms are a first
step. Gathering information is the beginning of learning. But imita-
tion of others without understanding the information gathered is what
makes learning wang, “bewildering” (Analects 2.15). To avoid bewil-
derment, one must think (si).
Philip Ivanhoe discerns two strands in Confucianism: one follow-
ing Confucius and Xunzi in emphasizing learning, associated with “a
religious reverence for the past, the sages and the records of their
activities”; the other following Mencius in emphasizing thinking, asso-
ciated with moral autonomy and the development of one’s “innate
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moral sensibility.”10 This distinction highlights a difference of empha-
sis that could have significant implications in certain contexts without
implying that any early Confucian would advocate one to the exclu-
sion of the other. Nor is learning necessarily more important than
thinking, and perhaps Confucius emphasizes learning only because
his audience paid insufficient attention to it. Neither emphasis on
learning or thinking, insofar as it is at the expense of the other, is ade-
quate—learning and thinking must go hand in hand for successful
self-cultivation.
Thinking is not an afterthought added to make learning useful.
Learning already involves thinking. We do not learn by gathering data
in an intellectual-emotional vacuum with perfectly neutral tools. Even
as we observe, read, or listen, we are already trying to make sense of
the data; and the extent to which something observed, read, or heard
becomes part of our understanding of the world depends on the
extent to which we could make sense of it. Learning something suc-
cessfully requires us to think about it in our own way, to find a place
for it in the mental map created by our accumulated experience.
Occasionally the map is also re-drawn in the learning process. But we
do not start with a blank slate. We bring to our learning the various
cognitive-emotional contents of our past experience. What we learn
in any one situation depends on our past experience and knowledge.
Confucius showed awareness of this in tailoring his teaching to each
student according to his experience, ability, and character.
Learning and thinking do not stand in dichotomous relation to each
other; they form a polarity wherein each enhances the other. Despite
some relative differences of emphasis that contrast learning with
thinking—contrasts which probably became starker later in the tra-
dition—mutual implication and interpenetration of learning and
thinking is more significant in pre-Qin Confucianism. Unless we
understand this polarity, sages are likely to end up as mere pattern-
cards providing only traditionalist constraints in Confucian self-
cultivation.
Thinking about Paradigmatic Characters
What kind of “thinking” is involved in the emulation of paradigmatic
characters? Could we assimilate it into some Western model of moral
reasoning? The role of reason in Confucian philosophy is a hotly
debated topic. Arthur Waley notes that the term si ( ) does not mean
“a process of logical reasoning, a sustained interior argumentation,
full of ‘therefores’ and ‘becauses’.” Others deny that reason, as con-
ceived in Western philosophy, is in any way central to Confucius’
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method of discourse.11 In contrast, David Soles attempts to show that
Confucius employs both valid deductive arguments and reasonable
inductive arguments, as well as engages in careful, tight conceptual
analysis.12 In Soles’ view, rational considerations play a key role in
Confucius’ philosophy. Kwong-loi Shun discusses Mencius’ concep-
tion of “moral reasons” and the problems it generates which are
shared by other Confucians and some Western moral theories.13
Heiner Roetz considers the role of reason unclear in Mencius’ ethics,
but argues that reason “is the true pivot of Xunzi’s philosophy,” which
he terms “rationalism.”14
The status of analogical reasoning, which Shun includes in his con-
ception of “moral reasons,” is sometimes suspect in Western moral
philosophy, but it constitutes an important part of pre-Qin philo-
sophical discourse in China.15 Imposing any kind “coercive logic” of
the West when assessing the role of reason in Chinese philosophy will
only lead to misunderstanding. It is quite possible that rules of think-
ing may vary as a result of linguistic and experiential differences in
cultures with vastly different histories. Even in Western philosophy,
the concepts of reason and rationality remain contested, and there is
no unanimous understanding of their role in morality.16 If we construe
moral reason very broadly as involving the giving of reasons in argu-
ments, without being too restrictive in stipulating what counts as legit-
imate reasons and acceptable arguments about what should be done
or what is good, then there is a place for it in Confucian ethics.
In the Analects, Confucius held up sage kings like Yao, Shun, Yu,
and lesser mortals such as the King Wen, Duke of Zhou, Guan Zhong,
Zang Wen Zhong, Liu Xiahui, Bo Yi, and Shu Qi who are neverthe-
less paradigmatic characters in their own ways, as exemplars his 
students should emulate. These characters from the past lived for
Confucius and his students only in the stories circulating about them.
Confucius’ own career as a paradigmatic character was accompanied
by the growth of stories about him. Some might be tempted to derive
arguments of the following kind from these narratives about para-
digmatic characters:
One should emulate P.
P did x in situation y.
A situation similar to y obtains.
Therefore one should do x.
At the very least, such an argument might seem to counter any
excuse that x cannot be done since it had already been done by at
least one human being. This is reinforced by the Mencian claim that
the sage and ordinary mortals are of a similar kind (Mencius 6A7).
Still, there remains the problem of how paradigmatic characters are
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identified or selected, and the similarity of situations is always open
to debate. Some might claim that every situation is unique; others
might end up with an over-abstraction of individual experience akin
to that for which rule-governed moral theories have been criticized.
The claim of species-similarity with sages notwithstanding, human
history shows that what was not possible before may be possible later,
and what was possible before may no longer be possible. Historical
veracity of narratives about paradigmatic characters is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient to justify emulating these characters in our own 
situations.
Narratives of Paradigmatic Characters
There is often disagreement about just what Confucius or other 
paradigmatic characters did or did not do. The problem is not simply
a matter of establishing empirical facts about the past. Many narra-
tives about paradigmatic characters of the Confucian tradition may
turn out to be fiction. But would these narratives become useless if
historians could somehow prove that the events described did not
actually take place? Presentations of Confucian paradigmatic char-
acters in literary narratives need not be less compelling or inspiring
than historical records. Both kinds of narratives provide possibilities
for experience, opportunities for imaginatively “trying out” meanings
and realities.
Confucian sages and exemplary persons do not serve as real life
illustrations of “a set of pre-existing truths”; studying their actions is
not about acquiring moral knowledge of the “eternal patterns” of the
Confucian way. Early Chinese philosophers were not concerned with
epistemology—and that includes moral epistemology. They focused
on authenticity instead of truth, sincerity instead of factual accuracy,
contextual appropriateness amidst constant change instead of
immutable standards and universal validity. Whether we should con-
tinue to emulate the paradigmatic characters as presented to us in
these narratives depends not on absolute truth of the events, but on
the authenticity of their interpretations of ethical experience.
Some might object to this as reducing historical narratives to liter-
ary narratives. I prefer to think that early Chinese texts about the past
should be treated as both. Differences in truth-expectations notwith-
standing, the two may not be as far apart as some people think. As
Hayden White remarks,“When a great work of historiography or phi-
losophy of history has become outdated, it is reborn into art.”17 Until
the end of the Eighteenth century, history was a branch of literature
in the West. The official histories of imperial China rely, almost exclu-
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sively on literary sources to construct their account of the past.18 This
has led to skepticism about the accuracy of China’s historical records.
Some contemporary scholars studying Chinese historiography also
doubt the objectivity of the traditional moralistic approach. Some
accuse early Chinese thinkers, including Confucius, of “distortions” in
turning history into “morality plays.”19
Recent archeological finds indicate that the historical records are
more accurate than the yigu (doubting antiquity) scholars had
thought.20 To see the “praise” and “blame” model of Chinese histori-
cal writing as precluding veracity is to impose a fact value distinction
which has no place in traditional Chinese thought, and which more-
over has come under attack by Western thinkers as well. While some
historians cling to historical realism, others do not see historical nar-
ratives as transparent reproductions of the past. For the latter, history
is a human construction.21 More radically, some argue that the past is
not related to readers in a “subject-object” confrontation in which
knowing subjects stand against the past as a given and fixed object;
the past is made and can be re-made through interpretations.
Chinese thinkers were often explicit and unapologetic about the
normative characteristic of narratives about the past. At least from
the time Mencius claimed that Confucius wrote the Spring and
Autumn Annals which, when completed,“struck terror into the hearts
of rebellious subjects and undutiful sons” (Mencius 3B9), Chinese
scholars took for granted that narratives about the past judged rather
than merely reported. Nor is the judgment merely about the past. It
is those who revitalize the past in order to realize the present (wengu
er zhixin) who could be teachers (Analects 2.11). Our concern with
the past is addressed in an experience of understanding in which we
engage in an open-ended dialogue with the past. What narratives of
paradigmatic characters, whether as history or as literature, have to
say to us is not some absolute truth, but depends on what we our-
selves bring to the conversation.22
Imagination and Understanding Paradigmatic Characters
There are often different versions of any event involving Confu-
cian paradigmatic characters. The differences are not just about extra-
neous details but reveal the different horizons of the narrators 
bringing forth different meanings. A re-telling is not mere repetition.
Every encounter with a narrative is an interpretive occasion. Inter-
pretation involves an imaginative participation in the ethical experi-
ence of the narrative. This involves perceiving the situation as having
certain meanings and qualities—a “perception akin to that by which
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we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle,” which
Aristotle insists is involved in phronesis (practical wisdom) when dis-
tinguishing it from Epistemé (knowledge).23 Our understanding of
experience cannot be separated from our interpretation of the world.
Paradigmatic characters are worthy of emulation because of the way
one interprets them even as one sees, hears, or reads about them.
Like Aristotle’s phronesis, one is not dealing with something uni-
versal and eternal in interpretation, but with something particular and
changeable. Mainstream Western conception of reason favors the uni-
versal over the particular, the abstract over the concrete; imagination
favors the particular over the universal, the concrete over the
abstract. The preference for the particular and concrete is evident in
the meaning of “thinking” in early Confucian texts. In introducing his
translation of the Analects, Arthur Waley claims that si—what is
usually translated as “thinking”—in its origin meant “observing
outside things. . . . It came to mean to fix attention not only on some-
thing exterior but also on a mental image.”24 Waley probably goes too
far in reducing thinking to a kind of “focusing” of attention. The
process of si includes a wide range of psychological and even psy-
chosomatic experiences. The thinking involved in emulating paradig-
matic characters includes the projection of mental images, that is, an
exercise of the imagination.
Despite being held in disrepute for much of Western philosophy’s
early history, imagination, as the ability to form mental images, was
acknowledged as having a role in thinking. From the Renaissance, the
distinction between good and bad imagination became more and
more important. David Hume, distinguishing between “the trivial
suggestions of fancy” from “the general and more established prop-
erties of imagination,” makes imagination arguably the most impor-
tant, certainly the most pervasive faculty of the mind in his science of
man.25 For Hume, imagination provides us the ideas with which to
think. For Kant, imagination enables us to synthesize the manifold of
sensation so that our experience in the world could be understood.26
Imagination provides the bridge between the bare data of sensation
and intelligible thought. It enables us to perceive an object as a par-
ticular separate from others, and to recognize it as something of a
kind. Kant also takes us a step further in going beyond associationist
conceptions of imagination. Imagination is not only reproductive; it
is also productive. What is imagined need not be analyzable into con-
stituent elements that are mere copies of previous impressions or
ideas.
Imagination has been mostly subordinated to reason in the history
of Western philosophy. For the early Greeks, whether as eikasia or
phantasia, imagination’s corporeal origin meant that it was considered
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unreliable, suspect, and mistrusted as it is seen as pandering to the
passions and the appetites.27 Later, Francis Bacon complains that
when men’s minds become “inflamed,” “it is all done by stimulating
the imagination till it becomes ungovernable, and not only sets reason
at nought, but offers violence to it.” Pascal names imagination 
“the mistress of falsehood and error.”28 Dr. Johnson’s Rasselas has 
a chapter “On the Dangerous Prevalence of Imagination” which
insists that “all power of fancy over reason is a degree of insanity.”
Imagination has been associated with madness from the time Plato
described poetic creation as an act of divine madness; the eighteenth-
century history of imagination was the history of madness.29 The tide
against the imagination turns when the Romantics like Coleridge
elevate imagination to the means of rescuing the human race from
the mind-body dualism that has plagued it for centuries. Imagination
becomes the way to reunify man with nature, to return by the path of
self-consciousness to a state of higher nature, a state of the sublime
where senses, mind, and spirit elevate the world around them even as
they elevate themselves. William Wordsworth considers imagination
“reason in its most exalted mood,” while William Blake thinks that
“Man is all imagination.”30
Besides receiving its due in literature and other arts, the role of
imagination in the construction of narratives in historiography has
also been recognized by some historians.31 Rudolf Makkreel argues
that a good historian participates in her subject matter through an
“orientational imagination,” makes her account convincing with “the
determinate synthesis of the hypothetical imagination,” and uses her
“reflective imagination” to articulate “the vague sense of connected-
ness already experienced in the lived world into more specific struc-
tures” that can be subjects of reflection. As Isaiah Berlin remarks,
imagination is a “prerequisite for history”; “otherwise the past is
dead.”32 Imagination is necessary to interpretation not just in histori-
ography but in every area of human endeavor. Some contemporary
Western moral philosophers argue for the need to supplement reason
with the imagination in an adequate account of moral experience.33
Psychologist Jerome Bruner asserts that the mandate of human sci-
ences today is to show “in detail how, in particular instances, narra-
tive organizes the structure of human experience—how, in a word,
‘life’ comes to imitate ‘art’ and vice versa”—narrative genres provide
“a guide for using mind.”34
To treat paradigmatic characters merely as the basis for some kind
of argument—whether deductive, inductive, or analogical—about
what we should do in any particular situation will not account for their
special importance, and indeed their power, within the Confucian tra-
dition. Rational argumentation is secondary to the presentation of
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paradigmatic characters to move us to emulate them. Imagination is
crucial to the process of understanding because it is able to give more
weight to particularities and because of its closer relation to the emo-
tions and desires. The unique personality of Confucius emerges to
move and inspire readers who get beyond superficial readings of the
Analects. This acknowledged world classic retains its power today not
because we are able to elicit hidden logical arguments in the laconic
passages, but because we could recreate Confucius and his commu-
nities of students in our imagination so that we could understand their
ethical experience and thereby broaden our ethical horizons.
Even when we encounter a paradigmatic character “in the flesh,”
the experience is not self-evident, but requires opening up to yield
meaning and reality. Instead of viewing everything superficially from
a fixed perspective, the one actually occupied, one needs to imagina-
tively shift perspective—most importantly, one needs to put oneself
in the situation of the paradigmatic character in order to understand
her virtues and how they are exercised in that situation. A good inter-
pretation requires us to imaginatively participate in that experience.
For emulation of paradigmatic characters to be relevant to contem-
porary virtue ethics, for the process to be successful, flexible yet not
overly permissive, we need to understand and appreciate why a par-
adigmatic character acted the way she did by making narratives
“come alive” for us. We need to imagine what her emotions and atti-
tudes were on that occasion, what she was responding to, what pur-
poses she had in mind. Only then could we understand paradigmatic
characters sufficiently to emulate them in a different set of circum-
stances. Imagination is required to extend understanding into prac-
tice. An adequate understanding of the paradigmatic character’s
actions implies the ability to act as the latter would act in new cir-
cumstances, since the original set of circumstances will not be
repeated in toto. Imagination of what will happen, including what one
will feel, how one will go about an act, and what reactions, conse-
quences will be forthcoming, contributes to the judgment of when and
how to emulate.
Successful Emulation: From Understanding to Practice
According to Gadamer, “all understanding is self-understanding.”35
Understanding paradigmatic characters and the situations in which
they exemplify ethical living results in a transformation of oneself. To
understand a paradigmatic character requires one to imagine and
reason so that one is able to appropriate the meaning and quality of
the situation and make them one’s own. One “makes them one’s own”
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only when one is able to apply them appropriately in different situa-
tions. This is possible because in the process of understanding, one
learns to discern and appreciate certain meanings and qualities—this
cultivates one’s sensibilities, one’s abilities to discern and appreciate
these meanings in future. Furthermore, the productive imagination
enables us to move from simply discerning and appreciating to cre-
ating values.
Emulation of paradigmatic characters will have an effect on our
ethical thinking and action only if it reaches our “hearts-minds (xin).”
In Confucian philosophical psychology, xin is the center of a person
in which understanding is found and from which practice proceeds.
Xin governs our person and conduct. It comprises consciousness,
thought, emotions, desires, as well as dispositions. The “unifying
thread” of Confucius’ teaching, the notion of shu—usually translated
as reciprocity, also as deference—could be understood as an empathic
process of “making one’s heart-mind resemble” that of an other so
that one would “not do to others what one would not others do to
oneself.”36 A similar process is involved in successful emulation,
wherein one also “makes one’s heart-mind resemble” the heart-mind
of the paradigmatic character.
The closest Chinese equivalent to intending or willing something,
zhi, is “setting one’s heart-mind” on something. Confucius’ self-
cultivation begins with setting his heart-mind on learning; his highest
ethical accomplishment is “to follow what his heart-mind desires
without overstepping the line” (Analects 2.4). He advises his students
to “set their hearts-minds on the way” (Analects 7.6). He praises Yan
Hui because the latter could go for several months without his heart-
mind departing from the virtue of ren (Analects 6.7). Cultivation of
the person (i.e., developing an ethical character) is a matter of
seeking, preserving, and nourishing one’s heart-mind constituted by
the virtues.37 According to Mencius: “[The Confucian virtues,] ren, yi,
li, zhi, are rooted in the heart-mind, which manifests itself in one’s
face, giving it a sleek appearance. It also shows in one’s back and
extends to one’s limbs, rendering their message intelligible without
words” (Mencius, 7A21).
The Chinese notion of xin problematizes any dualism of body and
mind, feeling and thinking. While Western philosophical thought has
often been prejudiced against both imagination and emotion, and
mistrusted them for their corporeal origins, early Chinese thought is
much more comfortable not dividing body and mind, or separating
thinking and feeling. Emotions differ from sensations, which can be
reduced to the psychical transposition of a physical stimulus, in having
cognitive-evaluative as well as affective constituents. Confucian
thinking (si) not only combines imagination and reason, but also
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includes emotions. In both the Analects and the Mencius, si used in
the sense of “thinking of” is an emotion of longing, incorporating
within itself a value judgment that something is desirable as well as a
desire to obtain or achieve it.38
Emotions have an important place in Confucius’ ethics. The
Analects begins with a passage about the delight of practicing what
one has learned, the joy of entertaining friends who come from afar,
and not being frustrated despite lack of recognition by others as a
mark of the exemplary person (Analects 1.1). Rites must be practiced
with respect, mourning with grief (Analects 3.26). Confucius also
speaks about other emotions such as fear, anxiety, resentment, dislike,
shame, anger, awe—having appropriate emotions is constitutive of
the ethical life.39 Confucianism, at least Confucianism of the pre-Qin
period, gives more weight to emotions relative to other moral theo-
ries. This is characteristic of virtue ethics. To Aristotle, a virtue is a
disposition towards both emotions and actions (1109b30). It is not
enough that one acts as a phronimos would act in any situation, one
must act with the appropriate emotions (1104b3–8). While some
moral theories require emotions to be subordinated to reason for
moral action, virtue ethics gives the emotions a positive and funda-
mental role in the ethical life.
There is a trend in contemporary Western philosophical psychol-
ogy towards cognitivism in its theories of emotion that tends to be
related to defense of the rationality of emotions.40 Instead of pushing
emotions towards reason, an exploration of the relation between
emotions and the imagination would be more profitable in under-
standing the role of emulating paradigmatic characters in virtue
ethics. Imagination stimulates emotions.41 A passion is “a sensual
motion of our appetitive facultie, through imagination of some good
or ill thing.”42 If we accept imagination as having a role in perception
itself, then its connection with emotion is not at all mysterious. How
we feel about a situation certainly depends on how we perceive it,
and vice versa. Unless we perceive someone’s action as being virtu-
ous, one would not feel the admiration, respect, and the desire to
emulate him or her.
Contemporary philosophical discussions of the relation between
imagination and emotion sometimes revolve around how fiction and
imaginative thinking could produce actual emotion.43 Emotions are
responses to mental events as well as external events. The imagina-
tion could engage actual emotions, as when a good actress actually
feels the emotions of the character she is portraying. This relation
between imagination and emotion is important to the process of self-
cultivation. For the experience of emotions through imagining nur-
tures the dispositions toward those emotions, as much as frequent
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practice of certain acts nurtures the dispositions towards those acts.
For emulation to be more than superficial imitation of exterior
aspects of an act, one must not only act, but also feel as a paradig-
matic character would feel in a situation. Confucius located the
ethical failure in his student’s objection to the ritual norm of three
years mourning not in a deficiency of reason, but as a case of buren,
which D.C. Lau translates as being “unfeeling.”44 The spontaneity
Confucius showed at the height of his ethical accomplishments means
that he could act virtuously without thinking, but he could not do so
without feeling: The spontaneity is a matter of “following his heart’s
desire” (Analects 2.4, italics added). Getting the emotions right is
therefore critical to successful emulation of a paradigmatic character.
Getting the emotions right is also a step towards getting the action
right. Confucius considers administrative injunctions and punish-
ments an inferior way of governing because then people “will stay out
of trouble, but will have no sense of shame.” In contrast, leadership
by excellence (i.e., virtues) will develop a sense of shame in the people
who will then “reform themselves” (Analects 2.3). One might read this
as simply stating the importance of emotions as well as actions in vir-
tuous living, or one might go one step further to link the emotion with
the action: The people order themselves because they have a sense of
shame. Shame renders mere avoidance of punishments unsatisfactory.
Even if no one else knows what one has done, one’s own awareness
of having done wrong keeps that unpleasant, even painful, emotion
alive. The only way to avoid that emotion of shame is to refrain from
doing anything wrong.
Some emotions are motives for actions, for they incorporate certain
desires. Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, and Hume include desire
among the passions of the soul.45 The Chinese traditionally includes
desires as one of the seven “qing,” together with the emotions of joy,
anger, grief, fear, love, and hatred.46 Logical reasoning and impersonal
reflection may be insufficient to prod one into action. Hume famously
asserts that reason can only be the “slave of passions” when it comes
to determining conduct. Michael Stocker seeks a cure for the “schiz-
ophrenia” of reasons and motives afflicting modern ethical theories
in the emotions.47 We need not go to the extreme of denying reason
any role to appreciate the importance of emotions in ethical motiva-
tion. Even for someone like Kant, it is arguable that the moral law
has such power in his philosophy only because it is one of the two
things that “filled his mind with awe.” Knowing what is one’s duty will
not necessarily result in doing one’s duty; one must have a respect 
for duty to be motivated to act dutifully. Awe and respect are both
emotions.
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The belief that emotions have an important role in governing our
actions goes back a long way. Elizabethans, for example, believed that
objects of imagination are communicated to the heart—generally
accepted as the seat of emotions—which is thus aroused to irascible
(avoiding) or concupiscible (desiring) reasons for action, which may
or may not actually take place.48 Most contemporary philosophical
and psychological studies still admit some kind of “action tendency”
or “motivational state” as constituents of the emotions, even though
it is difficult to defend a clear-cut conceptual or causal relation
between any emotion and specific action. Nico Frijda defines
“emotion” as action readiness resulting from situation appraisal.49
Even though there is much we do not understand about the actual
process, there is plenty of evidence that the emotions constitute an
important link in our interaction with our environments. The world
acting upon us, and sometimes our own mental activities, gives rise to
emotions which prompt us to act in further interaction with the world.
Our emotions incline us to take steps to either change the environ-
ment or change ourselves, or maintain the status quo, depending on
whether the emotion in question is painful or pleasant. How we even-
tually act may not be determined completely, but the inclination is
not therefore negligible.
Emulating paradigmatic characters play a key role in the Confu-
cian approach to cultivating the virtuous character. I have tried to
show that it is not a rule-governed activity—its emphasis is not the
exercise of reason, but the education of the imagination and emotions.
It has not been possible within the confines of this article to present
a complete philosophical psychology of emulating paradigmatic char-
acters, though such an endeavor would certainly be most enlighten-
ing. I am well aware that I have raised more questions than I have
answered; but unless we ask the appropriate questions, we will not
find any good answers.
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